

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Barrett, State
Mr. Davison, State
Mr. Crutcher, State
General Magruder, Defense
Colonel Davis, Defense
Admiral Stevens, JCS
Colonel Philbin, JCS
Mr. Frank Wisner, CIA
[redacted] CIA

SUBJECT: Psychological Strategy Board (PSB)

1. Attached hereto is the final edition of the papers which have been cooperatively prepared by the officials responsible for working out plans for the Psychological Strategy Board. I have made every effort to faithfully reflect the agreements which we have reached and have tried to make all the proposed changes which in recent days have been submitted. At [redacted] suggestion an editorial rearrangement of the papers has been made which I trust will in no way damage the substantive point.

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2. Immediately attached hereto is a paper entitled "Unofficial Comments and Suggestions of OPC Members of Ad Hoc Committee." While it is not requested that the group at this time reconsider the papers in the light of these suggestions it is hoped that these views will be read and at the appropriate time given consideration as the Board and its Staff evolve.

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[redacted]
JAMES Q. FEEH
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

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UNOFFICIAL COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS OF OPC MEMBERS OF AD HOC COMMITTEE

Our difficulty with the attachments to the memorandum proposed for Mr. Dulles' signature stems from the treatment of the issue described in the attachments as follows:

"Under one view the Psychological Strategy Board and its Staff would emphasize the function of coordination among existing agencies. Under another view the Psychological Strategy Board and its Staff would itself systematically plan and direct the psychological strategy of the 'cold' war."

In disagreeing over this issue the majority of the ad hoc group felt that it might be deferred until after the appointment of the Director. Although we would be perfectly content to have the question deferred until the Director is appointed, we do not believe that this is the action which the majority has taken. As we read the attachments, they require the Staff to be coordinators rather than planners, and we are fearful that the adoption of these terms of reference in their present form might well jeopardize the Director's ability to conceive of his functions as being otherwise.

The President's directive indicates that he intended that the Psychological Strategy Board be more than a coordinating mechanism. In our view, the Board is expected to define the objectives which this country should seek in the "cold" war situation, to develop the plans for attaining them, and to coordinate the carrying out of the plans by the responsible operating agencies. Thus, the purpose of his directive is "to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations." The Board is responsible "for the formulation and promulgation of overall psychological objectives, policies, and programs and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort," which is defined as including "all activities (other than overt types of economic warfare) envisioned under NSC 59/1 and 10/2."

The President's directive thus notes in effect that the weaknesses in our "cold" war effort are our lack of well-defined national objectives (below the NSC level) and our lack of an overall strategic plan for the achievement of these objectives. We feel, therefore, that the Board and its Staff should concentrate its efforts from the outset in the satisfaction of these requirements and that its organization papers should reflect this priority.

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Our recommendations as to the language in the attachments are based on this concept of the Board's purpose and on the assumption that the Board's Staff must play a principal part in assisting the Board to accomplish that purpose.

TAB B ✓

- a. We suggest the addition of the following subparagraphs a, b, and c:

"a. On the basis of existing intelligence, to conduct an intensive and continuing investigation of the vulnerabilities of the present Soviet regime to attack;

"b. Propose to the Board the objectives which can be attained by the United States in the "cold" war situation through the use of overt-covert weapons;

"c. Propose the general lines of action to be followed by the United States in the use of such weapons for the attainment of these objectives; recommend the allocation of operational responsibilities where these are not now established or in such cases where the transfer of responsibility will lie in the national interest."

- b. Substitute the following for subparagraph g:

"To investigate the possibilities of developing new and of improving present overt-covert weapons and techniques, and to arrange for the conduct by responsible departments and agencies of such research and development as is found necessary."

- c. Add new subparagraph:

"To consult with those Departments and Agencies responsible for the conduct of overt types of economic warfare to the end that US objectives, plans, and policies in this field be consistent with the objectives, plans, and policies adopted by PSB."

- d. The first task of the Staff should be that of reviewing the current situation and then of formulating strategic objectives and plans. If we do not start with this we will continue indefinitely on an ad hoc approach. This priority should be reflected in the chart of "Proposed Organization - Phase II" by indicating the immediate creation of a

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Plans Group and its activation prior to that of the operational coordination and programming and evaluation group shown on the chart. The Staff Director should have the authority to staff this group with individuals who are now employed by the Federal Government, as well as consultants, and the member departments and agencies should place a very high priority on assisting the director immediately to obtain the very best talent available.

- e. Note (1) authorizes the appointment of deputies to the Board membership. Although this is desirable and although, as stated in the note, the departmental responsibilities of such deputies should by all means be as broad as the scope of the Board's responsibilities, it is essential that the Board's business not be turned over to the deputies. In order to avoid this, we suggest deleting the second sentence of the note and substituting the following:

"For the purposes of a quorum, at least two of the Board's members must be present. In the absence of the Chairman, the Director will act as chairman."

PAR D

It is obvious from our previous comments that in our view the first task of the Board and its Staff is to set our "cold" war objectives and develop an initial strategy towards them which will encompass an integrated use of all available "cold" war weapons. Consequently, we suggest placing these two problems at the top of the Board's agenda. Since it is likely that the best solutions to other items presently on the agenda will be found only after the objectives and general overall strategy towards them have been adopted, we also suggest deferring these other items for the time being, during which they can be handled as at present.

Although we feel that the treatment of "psychological strategy in the 'cold' war" which appears in the annex is again too heavily weighted on the propaganda side, we think that the concept of a working group, composed as suggested, which would meet outside of Washington during the summer, is excellent. We suggest that this group be organized early in the summer and be asked to assist the Director and his Staff in preparing for the Board the statement of objectives and the broad strategy towards them, which we have referred to several times elsewhere.

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1 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Psychological Strategy Board (PSB)

1. Attached are papers which have been prepared interdepartmentally and approved for presentation to the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) by the principal advisers to the members of that Board.

2. It is our recommendation that you authorize the distribution of these papers to the members of the PSB with a view to calling a first meeting of the Board in the near future.

3. It is suggested that the agenda for the first meeting of the Board might be as follows:

a. To consider the proposed interim procedure (TAB A).

b. To approve the proposed functions and organization of the Director and his Staff as an aid to the new Director in setting up his organization (TAB B).

c. To note the paper (TAB C) prepared by General Magruder regarding his concept of the Board and the organization chart which has been developed to implement this concept. They are put forward to suggest the eventual nature of the Board and its Staff. It is not endorsed by all the participants and if, as, and when it is discussed representatives of the departments and agencies should have an opportunity to present their views. There is also attached under TAB C a paper submitted by Mr. Howland Sargeant of the Department of State commenting on General Magruder's paper.

d. To consider the relationship of the Psychological Strategy Board to the National Security Council.

e. To consider future business of the Board (TAB D).

ALLEN W. DULLES
Deputy Director (Plans)
Central Intelligence Agency

INTERIM PROCEDURE

In order to move ahead with the organization of the PSB the chairman, General Walter Bedell Smith, suggested that informal meetings be held among the representatives of the participating agencies in order to outline the field of work of the Board. Three such meetings have been held. The first under the chairmanship of General Walter Bedell Smith and the second and third under that of Mr. Allen Dulles. This group was composed as follows:

Mr. Dulles, CIA (presiding)
Mr. Barrett, State (or his representative)
General Magruder, Defense
Admiral Stevens, JCS

This group with the help of staff assistants in each agency has developed the set of papers of which this is a part.

This group is prepared to continue to sit, if desired by the Board, to deal with any further preparatory measures that may be necessary pending the appointment of a Director and his assumption of his duties.

FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR AND STAFF

In order to give effect to the terms of the President's Directive of April 4, 1951, the responsibilities of the Director and the functions of the Staff, subject to the Board, should be:

- a. to encourage the responsible agencies to produce ideas in support of psychological operations which include those matters envisaged under the NSC 59 and NSC 10 series;
- b. as necessary, to coordinate, expedite, and ensure the expansion of the planning and implementing of psychological policies and programs;
- c. to initiate and formulate proposals, including proposals for national psychological strategy, which would be referred as appropriate to the Board or directly to the responsible operating departments or agencies for development and execution;
- d. to ensure that the psychological policies, objectives and programs promulgated by the Board are within the capabilities of execution of the operating agencies or, if not, to recommend to the Board that such special administrative personnel and logistical support as may be required from appropriate departments and agencies be made available;
- e. to make a broad and continuing evaluation of current and proposed operations in the light of national plans and to recommend improvements to the operating agencies based on this review;

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f. to assure that in the determination, pronouncement and implementation of political, economic and military policies, adequate attention is given to their psychological effects and to existing psychological programs;

g. to assure that the programs of psychological operating agencies will be furthered by U. S. Government official pronouncements;

h. to encourage, receive, and review proposals and research bearing on psychological operations from private and official sources outside the operating departments and agencies and to make these available as appropriate to such agencies;

i. to provide secretariat services, including:

(1) preparation of reports as directed by the Board;

(2) organization of the business of the Board and expedition of decisions;


(3) promulgation of the decisions of the Board;

j. to assemble such intelligence and such policy and operational information as necessary for the performance of the above functions;

k. to examine continually the functions of the Board and Staff in order to ensure that the facilities and resources of the participating departments and agencies are utilized to the maximum extent.

(A proposed chart of organization for fulfillment of these functions is attached hereto.)

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NOTE: (1) It is expected that each member of the Board will designate a deputy whose responsibilities include all matters over which the Board itself has cognizance. In the absence of the three principal Board members at any meeting, the Director will act as chairman. The Board may solicit the advice of non-governmental consultants as required.

(2) No attempt has been made to specify which unit or units would perform each of the Staff functions listed on the preceding page. In view of the small size of the proposed Staff this should be left to the Director who will allocate them in accordance with the individual qualifications of his assistants. In performing these functions, however, the Staff will utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the participating departments and agencies.

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TAB C

CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE
DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
IN THE COLD WAR

The attached paper and organization chart has been prepared by General Magruder and presents a concept toward which the Board and its Staff might evolve. No new functions as such are envisaged but it is based on a much broader interpretation of the agreed functions. While agreeing that "the Board shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the participating departments and agencies," the group disagreed on what constituted the "maximum extent." Under the view expressed in TAB B the PSB and its Staff would emphasize the function of coordination among existing agencies. Under the concept in the attached the PSB and its Staff would itself systematically program and control the psychological strategy of the Cold War. This involves a much larger independent planning role and much more contact with the detailed operations of the agencies than could be unanimously endorsed by the representatives.

Also included under this TAB are comments on General Magruder's paper submitted by Mr. Howland Sargeant of the State Department.


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PLEASE INSERT YOUR COPY
OF GENERAL MAGRUDER'S PAPER,
"PSB" , 21 MAY 1951 (REV.)

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POSSIBLE ORGANIZATION - PHASE III



* From the Government or private life.

** MAXIMUM use to be made of regional and functional specialists available in the operating departments and agencies.

COMMENTS OF MR. HOWLAND SARGEANT ON
"CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE DYNAMIC
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE COLD WAR"

The subject paper is a personal expression of General Magruder designed to be helpful in the establishment of the new Psychological Strategy Board. While most of the concepts in the paper are ones with which I would heartily agree, there are a few points to which I would take exception. These differences are mainly matters of degree rather than of kind, but it may be useful to try and express them.

The following principles seem to me to be basic to the successful operation of the Board:

1. Our psychological program will succeed only as personnel and offices responsible for detailed planning and implementation perform their functions with greater and greater efficiency. To impose a large super-structure on top of them and to remove many of their functions in whole or in part would, I believe, introduce new requirements for coordination and liaison activities, deal a serious blow to the morale of persons now engaged in psychological operations, and in the end result in diminishing rather than increasing the efficiency of their work. Activities of the new PSB staff can result either in stifling the initiative of lower echelons or in inspiring them to greater efficiency. Every effort should be made to see that the latter result is achieved.
2. With respect to psychological programming, the principal need which the new Board and its staff can fill is that of formulating very broad government-wide policies, especially such policies as are presently beyond the competence of any single department or agency. The application of these policies to concrete operating situations should be entrusted to the individual agencies. It should be noted that the tendency in many administrative structures is to secure the services of competent experts and then to overload them with details to such a degree that they are unable to devote more than a very few minutes of their time to the larger picture. This is especially true in the field of psychological operations. To over-simplify the matter, it might be said that more exhaustive attention is often given comparatively minor matters of detail than to broad questions of major importance. Consequently, it is of utmost importance that the staff of the new Board and the Director himself should not be overloaded with detailed matters of administration or implementation. This is one of the principal reasons for keeping the staff small and whenever possible arranging for the delegation of functions to existing agencies.

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3. The number of individuals in the United States who are competent to serve on the staff of the new Board is very small indeed. A few might be obtained from outside the government, but the majority of them are already occupied in existing agencies. If we strip these agencies of their most highly-qualified policy personnel, we will have lost more than we have gained since, as noted in one above, the ultimate success or failure of our psychological operations will depend most of all upon the efficiency of the individual agencies.

* * * * *

There are several points at which General Magruder's paper may conflict with these principles, although it is possible that the apparent conflict rests in the manner in which certain passages are interpreted. The following comments are offered by way of example:

In paragraph 19 on page 6 it is stated that the staff should be responsible under the Director for the formulation and promulgation in practical operating terms of coordinated world-wide and regional psychological policies, objectives and programs. It is further stated that this function cannot be delegated to operating agencies. It is my feeling that the staff should in fact delegate most of the preliminary work in this connection to operating agencies and should itself be responsible only for the final formulation and promulgation. Furthermore, this formulation should not attempt to be in "operating" terms if this means that the needs of each medium must be spelled out, nor should it be in "regional" terms if this means that detailed consideration should be given to the differing requirements of each country. The implementation of policy by various communications media and the requirements of specific regions could more efficiently be spelled out in detail by experts in the existing agencies.

In paragraph 19c, also on page 6, it is said that the staff should make a continuous evaluation of the results of operations with a view to making prompt adjustments in the programs when necessary. My objection may be merely a matter of wording, but I feel that the words "make a prompt adjustment" implies a degree of involvement in operations which was not contemplated by the Presidential directive. Perhaps it would be adequate to say merely that the staff should recommend such adjustments to the operating agencies.

Paragraph 20 on page 6 expresses the fear that if the Director and staff give themselves up to pondering and planning, we would have succeeded only in establishing another Ivory Tower. Herein,

I believe, there is a difference only in emphasis, but I believe that this wording might obscure the fact that at the present time our detailed planning is often far in advance of our long-term planning. Would it not be better to encourage the Director and staff to "ponder and plan" as long as this cerebration is harnessed to the realities of operations. As stated above, we have not given our most qualified thinkers an opportunity to think. Let us insure that some of them at least have an opportunity to do so in the staff of PSB.

Paragraph 21 on page 6 suggests that the staff should include certain regional and functional chiefs who are outstanding experts in their respective geographical and functional areas. Certainly it is to be hoped that personnel can be found for PSB who will have certain regional or functional qualifications, but PSB should not try to compete with the operating agencies when it comes to regional or functional experts. Instead, PSB policy experts should plan to rely principally on the regional and functional specialists in the various agencies.

Paragraphs 23 and 24 suggest the creation of a "strategy group." It is my feeling that the entire senior staff of the PSB should be considered such a strategy group and that to create a special organization so entitled within the PSB staff would imply that the rest of the PSB staff would be concerned with details which might more appropriately be left to the operating agencies.

In general, my feeling is that the PSB should strive to conduct its business with as small a staff as possible and should attempt to perform only such substantive tasks as are in addition to those now being performed in the operating departments and agencies. It may be that this conception is not far removed from that expressed in General Magruder's paper, but that paper may also be interpreted as advocating a large staff which would to a large extent duplicate or supplant certain functions of existing agencies. These comments, therefore, are intended only to highlight the differing interpretations which are possible and to assist in their resolution.

S E C R E TPROBLEMS FOR CONSIDERATION

1. The attached list contains substantive problems which it is suggested the Board should consider. Although work is already going forward to some extent on all these items, the amount of progress varies considerably. It is recommended that the Board select the most important and urgent ones and direct their staffs to expedite the preparation of papers for PSB consideration.

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I. Substantive Problems

A. Suggestions for Priority Attention

1. The defection of Communist China from the USSR
2. Psychological strategy to be followed on the death of Stalin
3. A strategic psychological plan for [] and measures for immediate application
4. Psychological policies on public statements with regard to the Atomic Bomb
5. Subversion, demoralization and defection of Soviet troops in East Germany

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B. Other Items

6. A psychological plan for []
7. National policy measures designed to increase desired defections (both in and outside combat areas)
8. Psychological strategy with regard to the universal desire for Peace:
 - a. desirability of a disarmament proposal
 - b. countering Soviet 1951 Peace Campaign
9. Implementation of Project [] report

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II. Long-Term Projects (See attachment)

1. Psychological strategy in the Cold War
2. Psychological measures to insure that constructive relationships can be maintained and developed among the United States and the governments and peoples of nations, as in NATO, whose cooperation is essential to the national security.
3. Campaign to improve the personnel situation in psychological operations

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4. Survey of policy planning and research in the field of psychological operations
5. Survey of activities evaluating the effectiveness of psychological operations

III. Administrative

1. National psychological warfare and special operations personnel control and allocation
2. Measures to refine operational psychological warfare techniques
3. Cover and deception in current national psychological warfare toward USSR (e.g. the utilization of attaches, correspondents and agents)

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SUGGESTED INITIAL PROJECTS FOR PSB

I. Psychological Strategy in the Cold War

Many individuals working in the field of psychological operations in the Cold War have felt the absence of a "grand-strategy" -- a set of objectives toward the attainment of which all efforts can be directed. One cannot be so sanguine as to hope that such a strategy can be clearly outlined by any one agency or in a short period of time. Furthermore, it is a matter which clearly goes far beyond the competence of psychological operations specialists. These difficulties, however, do not excuse psychological operations planners from making what contribution they can toward the grand strategy, and the establishment of a Psychological Strategy Board gives them a better opportunity of doing so than they have had heretofore. It is believed, therefore, that one of the first tasks of the new board should be to set in motion a major effort to formulate a broad, worldwide psychological strategy for the Cold War.

A suggested procedure for accomplishing this is as follows:

1. Appointment of a working group composed of the nation's very best brains from both inside and outside the government in the field of psychological operations and making provision to see that they have facilities for concentrated work. The group should also include experts in political and military strategy. It is felt that the prestige of the Board will be such that it can command the services of individuals who would not ordinarily be available to work personally on such a project.

2. A working place outside Washington should be designated for meetings. It has been noted in previous similar cases that it is much simpler to enable top quality men to work on problems of this sort personally (rather than delegating them to subordinates) if they can be insulated from the pressure of routine duties. This insulation procedure is commonly adopted by such agencies as Brookings and RAND with a considerable measure of success.
3. The group should be asked to work on such very broad problems as the following:
 - a. What psychological and other measures can be taken to restrain Soviet aggression?
 - b. What psychological and other measures can be taken to strengthen our allies and potential allies?
 - c. How may the best statement of U. S. ideology be arrived at?
 - d. How can our Cold War aims be defined?
4. The following measures should be taken in preparation for this working group:
 - a. Make necessary arrangements for meeting place, secretarial help, security, etc.

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- b. Prepare briefing papers. (For example, an analysis of NSC papers and Presidential statements having a bearing on psychological operations.)
 - c. Arrange for oral briefings by governmental experts, as needed.
5. The full group should be asked to meet for a three or four day period at the beginning of the summer and for a three or four day period toward the end of the summer. In between the two full meetings sub-groups should be asked to work on specific phases of the overall problem.
6. It should be emphasized that this is not to be viewed as an effort to work out a national policy binding on all agencies. It is rather an attempt to answer two questions:
- a. From the point of view of psychological operations, what should our national policy be?
 - b. How may existing national policy be exploited more effectively through psychological operations?

II. A Long-Term Campaign to Improve the Personnel Situation in Psychological Operations

This campaign might be divided into two parts: (1) an effort to improve and coordinate training programs, and (2) an effort to induce superior personnel who already have the available qualifications to enter government service in the field of psychological operations. A considerable amount of basic work on the first part has already been accomplished, but coordination is still lacking. An approach to the second part might be as follows:

- (1) Ascertain through interviews with leading experts outside the government what their principal objections to entering government service are.
- (2) Work out, with all agencies affected, a long-term publicity program designed to attract first-rate personnel.
- (3) Approach key members of Congress with a view to obtaining their support in this campaign.

III. Policy Planning and Research Survey

This survey, which would be undertaken primarily by the temporary PSB with outside advice solicited as needed, should attempt to answer the following questions:

1. What policy planning for the cold war and hot war in the field of psychological operations is currently going on?
2. What basic research for psychological operations in the cold war and hot war is currently going on?
3. What additional planning and research is needed, and what agencies should undertake it?

IV. Survey of Evaluation Activities

This survey should be undertaken along the same lines as the above.

PCB: vth
5/21/51